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Review of the Roots of Youth Violence: Research Papers

Volume 4

Governance Models for the Roots of Youth Violence

A Report Prepared for the Review of the Roots of Youth Violence



Institute on Governance

16 April 2008

The Institute On Governance (IOG) is a Canadian, non-profit think tank that provides an independent source of knowledge, research and advice on governance issues, both in Canada and internationally.

Governance is concerned with how decisions important to a society or an organization are taken. It helps define who should have power and why, who should have voice in decision-making, and how account should be rendered.

Using core principles of sound governance — legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability, and fairness — the IOG explores what good governance means in different contexts.

We analyze questions of public policy and organizational leadership, and publish articles and papers related to the principles and practices of governance. We form partnerships and knowledge networks to explore high priority issues.

Linking the conceptual and theoretical principles of governance to the world of everyday practice, we provide advice to governments, communities, business and public organizations on how to assess the quality of their governance, and how to develop programs for improvement.

You will find additional information on our activities on the IOG website at

www.iog.ca

For further information, please contact:

Gail Motsi
Institute On Governance
122 Clarence Street
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada K1N 5P6
tel: +1 (613) 562-0090
fax: +1 (613) 562-0097
info@iog.ca
www.iog.ca
[IOG 2007-2069]

Introduction

Review of the Roots of Youth Violence

On June 11, 2007 the Premier of Ontario established a Review of the Roots of Youth Violence, headed by former Chief Justice Roy McMurtry and former Speaker of the provincial legislature Alvin Curling. The establishment of the Review followed the May 23, 2007 homicide of 15-year-old Jordan Manners at C.W. Jefferys Collegiate Institute in Toronto.

The objective of the Review is to help identify and analyze underlying factors contributing to youth violence and to make recommendations on how to create opportunities for youth to maximize their potential and how to make communities and schools safer.

In undertaking its work, the Review will consider existing provincial investments and programs, assess approaches in other jurisdictions, and identify further opportunities for the prevention of youth violence and for the rehabilitation of youth. This will be done through research, targeted consultation and community insight sessions.

The Report of the Review is due in September 2008 and its recommendations have not yet been formulated. For the purpose of this report, we have assumed that an effective response to the issue of youth violence requires not only the sharing of information and the coordination of activities, but also more sharing of authority, resources and results, and ultimately the delegation of responsibilities and resources linked to a shared vision.

Review of Governance Models

As part of the Review, the Institute On Governance (IOG) was contracted to look at governance and structural issues that must be addressed in order to develop a coordinated and multi-level response to youth violence. This included a review of research and reports (refer to References) and an analysis of examples in Canada and in other countries that were designed to coordinate at policy and operational levels within an order of government, across governments, and with communities. Critical success factors were to be identified for horizontal, vertical and community-based coordination on the kinds of issues and ranges of interests being addressed by the Review of Roots of Youth Violence and options identified for recommendation by the Review to the Government of Ontario.

Deliverables

This report represents the final deliverable under the contract. It is based upon the results of an extensive literature review and a desk study of 16 examples of coordination, complemented by the Institute’s previous experience in conducting research into governance and working with various public purpose organizations on governance issues. Barriers to coordination and mechanisms and structures to overcome those barriers have been identified and presented to two focus groups — one with senior government officials in the Ontario Public Service in February 2008 and one with community representations in Ontario in March 2008. These focus groups commented on the findings and conclusions and provided advice on what options would be most applicable in the Ontario context. Preliminary conclusions were also presented to the Co-Chairs and the Secretariat and discussed.

The report first outlines some terminology and concepts related to the issues of governance and coordination. It then applies this conceptual framework to the examples in order to explore the issues further and draw out various aspects related to improving coordination within one order of government, across different orders of government, and at the community level. It concludes by identifying various options that could be recommended by the Review to the Ontario government for a coordinated response to the roots of youth violence.

Governance

What Is Governance?

The Institute On Governance defines governance as:

the process whereby societies or organizations make important decisions, determine whom they involve and how they render account.

Governance is therefore not synonymous with government. It is about how governments and other social organizations interact, how they relate to citizens, and how decisions are taken in a complex world.

Since a process is hard to observe, we tend to focus our attention on the governance system or framework upon which the process rests — that is, the agreements, procedures, conventions or policies that define who gets power, how decisions are taken, and how accountability is rendered.

Who Are the Players? Who Has Influence? Who Decides?

Understanding governance is made easier if one considers the different kinds of entities that occupy the social and economic landscape.

Governance Across Sectors

Governance Across Sectors

This diagram illustrates the four sectors of society, situated among citizens at large: governments, the institutions of civil society (including the voluntary or not-for-profit sector), business and the media. The size of each sector as illustrated may provide a crude indication of their relative power in many western countries. They overlap because the borders of these organizations are permeable. Finally, governance is influenced by the history, traditions, culture and technology of the context within which it takes place.

Five Principles of Good Governance

We base our work on a set of five governance principles drawn from the literature and international precedence:1

1) Legitimacy and voice — participation and a consensus orientation

2) Direction — strategic vision

3) Performance — responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency

4) Accountability and transparency

5) Fairness — equity and the rule of law.

In grouping the principles under five broad themes, we recognize that they often overlap or are conflicting at some point, that they play out in practice according to the actual context, that applying such principles is complex, and that they are about not only the results of power but also how well it is exercised.

Coordination

What Is Coordination?

Our review of the literature indicates that working across line departments, sectors of society and orders of government, and with communities on complex policy issues and problems is not a new phenomenon, but one that has received increased attention in the past decade or so. It has been variously called horizontal and vertical management, joined-up government, whole of government, and collaborative or networked government in countries like Canada, the UK, Australia, and the U.S.

In terms of this report, there is no one term that easily encompasses all of the issues and the examples that we have looked at. We have therefore found it useful to try and categorize the various terms by making a distinction according to what is being shared.2 The following table presents a continuum in the “degrees of coordination” from communication through cooperation to collaboration and ultimately delegation.

Degree of Coordination Definition What is Being Shared Related Terms
communication
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to exchange information of common interest and benefit knowledge, views, advice = shared information consultation
cooperation
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to harmonize separate activities or services to achieve mutually beneficial results schedules, activities = shared work association networking
collaboration
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to combine separate activities into a joint activity, service or enterprise to achieve mutually agreed results authority, resources, results = shared authority partnerships integration
delegation to delegate responsibility and accountability to another entity to achieve common goals or a shared vision goals, aims, objectives = shared vision, shared power decentralization, devolution, enablement, empowerment

Cooperation, collaboration and delegation all require new ways of working, new leadership, new structures, and a new culture. The degree of coordination that you are trying to achieve also influences the kinds of processes, structures, and tools that you use.

For ease of reference we will use the term “coordination” in the remainder of this paper to refer to cooperation, collaboration and delegation unless there is a particular point that we want to make in terms of collaboration or delegation.

Types of Coordination

Another way of looking at coordination is in terms of what actors are involved. From this perspective, we will be using three main categories:

Horizontal across different departments and agencies within one order of government
Vertical across different orders of government
Community-based across a number of organizations or agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, at a community level. Community can be defined in spatial terms or in terms of interests or identity, but our focus will be more on the former definition. As such, this includes municipalities, neighbourhoods or other geographically-defined communities.

In reality, many initiatives include aspects of all of these types of coordination; hence the use of terms such as “whole of government” or “joined-up government.”

Focus of Coordination

There are various types of government activities that can be the focus of coordination:3

Policies — for example, cross-cutting spending reviews

Transfers — for example, the collection of provincial income tax by the Canada Revenue Agency or the administration by nine provinces and territories of the Canada Student Loan Program

Regulations — for example, joint inspections by health and safety, environment, and data protection regulators

Programs — for example, a joint initiative of schools, police, health, and other agencies to combat juvenile delinquency

Services — for example, integrated child welfare program with inter-professional targeting of cases, or integrated online package of services defined by “life events” (birth, death, marriage, etc.)

Furthermore, these activities may be targeted at individuals, specific groups, organizations or communities. Depending on the issue that is being addressed, all of these activities may be relevant. At the community level, the coordination of programs and services is likely to be the most critical.

Drivers of Increased Coordination

In response to the inherent unwieldiness of large governments separated into departments, ministries, and assorted agencies, and the division of powers and jurisdictions across orders of government, there have long been calls for enhanced coordination.4 A recent review by the Australian government corresponds with Canadian research in suggesting that the drivers for horizontal or whole-of-government approaches are: increasingly demanding citizens, new information and communications technologies, continuing pressure on public sector budgets, experimentation with new ways of delivering services, and greater recognition of the complexity of social problems and the range of expertise from different institutions and sectors required to tackle them.5 Similarly, research done for the Ontario Public Service identified increased expectations among citizens and businesses, increased expectations from other jurisdictions, aging infrastructure, the pace of change, and the fiscal environment as the drivers for partnership.6

Previous and current models of public service management based on hierarchical command and control are no longer considered to be adequate. The causal factors for many social problems are the same, the costs of intervention are escalating with little evidence of a return on investment, and communities are becoming increasingly disillusioned by governments’ inability to solve their problems. Short-term approaches such as one-off pilots or demonstration projects are not sustainable enough to have a long-term impact.7

When Is Coordination Most Appropriate

Coordination is assumed to increase effectiveness, improve quality, reduce gaps in services or programs, and/or avoid duplication. Community-based organizations are included in order to improve access to previously excluded groups and give them a voice in decision-making, and to take into account the local context and dynamics. As a result, social capital is expected to be increased and communities renewed.

Coordination can also be more expensive and require more time and a sustained commitment. It may compete with other political and community agendas or the ongoing delivery of regular services and programs. It is therefore important to be selective about when to apply such an approach.

Coordination is considered to be best suited for “wicked or sticky problems”8 or “intractable social issues” that “defy jurisdictional boundaries and are resistant to bureaucratic routines.”9 This includes issues such as social exclusion, crime prevention and racism being considered by the Review. Coordination is also considered suitable for issues that require joint priority and attention by relevant agencies for a more limited time. Finally, it may also be used to establish integrated service centres responsive to certain clients or communities.10

Many social problems are spatially concentrated in cities and certain neighbourhoods within cities — problems such as poverty, homelessness, crime and so forth.11 These problems demand place-sensitive, holistic approaches — strategies built from the ground up on the basis of local knowledge and delivered through networked relations, crossing program silos and even jurisdictional turfs.12 All levels of government are active in cities, but their activities are not coherently and systematically coordinated.

Four elements have been proposed for a place-based policy framework combining an urban planning perspective and a community perspective:

  1. Tapping local knowledge
  2. Finding the right policy mix between spatially targeted measure for distressed areas and aspatial policies for health, employment, education, etc.
  3. Governing through collaboration, with new relationships among government, society, and the economy and across governments at different levels
  4. Recognizing local governments as key actors in terms of their legitimacy, access to local citizens and actors, and as convenors.13

Barriers to Increased Coordination

A study by the Institute of Public Administration Australia identified four types of barriers to greater coordination:14

  1. Structural — e.g., constructs that are not easily changed, such as federalism, the separation of powers across jurisdictions, branches of government, constitutional and legal requirements
  2. Bureaucratic — e.g., constructs which may also be difficult to change but can be influenced within the bureaucracy, such as civil services, regulatory issues, public accountability versus flexibility
  3. Political — e.g., political and stakeholder influences
  4. Internal — e.g., organizational culture.

Of these barriers, the IPAA found that the bureaucratic ones were the most prominent and therefore most likely to be addressed by senior management within government. Structural barriers affect the options that are available, and success may be hampered by the lack of a political mandate for change.15

Illustrative Examples

Having outlined our understanding of governance and the different aspects of coordination in the previous two sections, we will now look at some examples to illustrate various points and identify critical factors that could be related to the Review of the Roots of Youth Violence and its recommendations to the Ontario government.

A selection of 16 examples was initially made, based on our proposal, suggestions made by the Review of the Roots of Youth Violence Secretariat, and our review of the literature. The examples represent horizontal, vertical and/or community-based coordination to varying degrees. Many cover all types of coordination, although they may illustrate one type more clearly.

The following table provides the complete list of the examples. A more detailed summary is provided in Annex 1.

Initiative Order of Government
Horizontal Initiatives
Social Exclusion Task Force, Cabinet Office, UK National/Local
Race, Cohesion and Faiths Directorate, UK National/Local
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion, Quebec Provincial/Regional/Local
Cabinet Committee on Race Relations, Ontario Provincial
Smart Growth, Ontario Provincial/Regional
Vertical Initiatives
Vancouver Agreement, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Crime Prevention Strategy, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion, Quebec Provincial/Regional/Local
Local Health Integration Networks, Ontario Provincial/Regional
Community-Based Initiatives
Local Strategic Partnerships, UK National/Local
Youth Inclusion Programme, UK National/Local
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Crime Prevention Strategy, Canada National/Provincial/Local
Children’s Services Committees, Ontario Provincial/Local
Neighbourhood Action Teams, Toronto Local
Neighbourhood Integrated Service Teams, Vancouver Local
Community Safety & Crime Prevention Council, Waterloo Region Community
Community Action, Quebec Provincial/Community

The examples by no means illustrate all of the possible approaches that can be taken, but they do provide some insight into a number of different approaches. They deal with issues such as youth violence, crime prevention, social exclusion, urban or community development, health, housing, and the environment. They come from a number of jurisdictions — municipalities in Ontario and elsewhere, provincial governments including Ontario, and national governments in Canada and the UK. Most of the examples have taken place within the last ten years, but there are a few that are older.

It is important to note that we were not able to determine the “success” of each example. In some cases, the outcomes were not clearly defined and therefore success could not be measured. In other cases, the initiative is too new and therefore it is too soon to assess the results. In a few cases, the initiative was cancelled or changed before its outcomes could be assessed. Finally, our review was based almost entirely on desk research, the time available was limited, and therefore our understanding of the dynamics and processes of each initiative is incomplete. We have however been able to draw on evaluations or research studies for some of the examples.

The following sections examine the governance issues related to each type of coordination in more detail. One or two examples are used to illustrate some of the difficulties that may typically be encountered, and one or two of the more interesting examples are drawn on to look at how these challenges may be addressed in new or innovative ways.

Horizontal Coordination

Examples Used Order of Government
Horizontal Initiatives
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion, Quebec Provincial/Regional/Local
Social Exclusion Task Force, Cabinet Office, UK National/Local
Cabinet Committee on Race Relations, Ontario Provincial

The National Homelessness Initiative (NHI)16 was an initiative of the Government of Canada to address the homelessness crisis in Canada. It was created in response to political pressure, announced in December 1999 as a three-year initiative, and eventually extended to 2007. The total budget over the seven years was almost $1.3 billion.

The Initiative was designed to develop community-based measures that assisted homeless individuals and families to move toward self-sufficiency. It was made up of nine components, including several new programs, enhancements to existing programs and a national research program. Federal funding was linked to the development of community plans that identified and addressed needs and gaps over the immediate and long term.

At the federal level, the NHI ostensibly involved nine or more departments or agencies. Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) was the lead department, and the National Homelessness Secretariat in that department provided some overall direction and coordination. Interdepartmental meetings were held largely to exchange information. Implementation authority for NHI was delegated to federal regional councils across the country and interdepartmental committees of the Federal Councils provided some coordination at that level.17

An audit in 2005 found that related federal programs under the NHI were not brought together, already existing programs were not redesigned when the new ones were introduced, and various federal areas of expertise (e.g., health or housing) were not drawn upon for the design and delivery of the initiative.18 As a consequence:

A case study on the NHI suggested several possible reasons for the lack of horizontality:19

In our view, the challenges facing NHI were primarily of a governance nature:

In terms of these issues, Quebec’s National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion provides an interesting contrast. The idea of a framework law for the elimination of poverty was initiated by a broad-based citizens’ movement called the Collective for a Poverty Free Quebec. The Collective consulted widely over a number of years and tabled its proposed law in May 2000 in the National Assembly. In June 2002, the Quebec government introduced Bill 112, An Act to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion and in August 2002 a ten-year National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion was released. In December 2002, the bill was unanimously approved by the Quebec National Assembly and in April 2004 a five-year Action Plan to implement the National Strategy was adopted. A total of $2.5 billion was set aside in the Budget of 2004/05 for the various measures in the Strategy, and this has been increased to a total of $3 billion to date. A fund was also set up to finance social initiatives to combat poverty and social exclusion at a regional and community level.

The act guides the government and Quebec society as a whole towards a process of planning and implementing activities to combat poverty, prevent its causes, reduce its effects on individuals and families, counter social exclusion, and strive towards a poverty-free Quebec. The National Strategy sets a collective goal of progressively transforming Quebec, over a ten-year period, into one of the industrialized societies with the least poverty. It focuses on initiatives in five major areas:

  1. Prevention: promoting personal empowerment through the support of families, young people and vulnerable adults
  2. Strengthening the social and economic safety net by increasing basic income guarantees for individuals and families and providing more social housing
  3. Promoting job access and employment through employment assistance, the social integration of individuals unable to work, and improved job quality
  4. Mobilizing society as a whole by encouraging public involvement, supporting local and regional initiatives, recognizing and rewarding socially responsible enterprises, and strengthening the role of community organizations
  5. Ensuring consistency and coordination of action at all levels through a framework for action and monitoring mechanisms.

The Action Plan sets forth a set of 47 measures to be undertaken by various departments in the provincial government over a five-year period to achieve the goals of the National Strategy. There are nine departments and sectoral agencies involved, covering employment, social assistance, education, recreation and sport, health, social services, immigration, cultural communities, family, labour, municipalities and regions, housing, and youth.

The Minister of Employment and Social Solidarity (MESS) is the lead minister, responsible for the administration of the act, tabling the action plan, annual progress reports, and a status report every three years in the National Assembly, and making any agreements with national, regional, and local partners. The minister acts as advisor to the government on issues related to poverty and social exclusion, gives other ministers advice, takes part in the development of measures that could have a significant impact on persons and families living in poverty, can request specific reports from other ministers on activities carried out in their fields of jurisdiction, and may propose amendments to the Action Plan.

Each minister is required to give an account of the impacts of any proposals of a legislative or regulatory nature on the incomes of persons or families living in poverty when presenting such proposals to the government. There are three interdepartmental committees — one for monitoring the implementation of the Action Plan, one for evaluation and one for communications.

The act required that an observatory on poverty and social exclusion be set up to provide dependable and objective information on poverty issues and social exclusion, particularly of a statistical nature. This observatory was created in the spring of 2005 and is attached to the research, evaluation, and statistical directorate of MESS, but managed by a committee composed of representatives from government, the academic and research community, and persons working in the field of poverty and social exclusion. The Centre not only conducts qualitative and quantitative research and transfers knowledge, but is also responsible for developing and proposing to the minister a series of indicators to be used to monitor progress achieved within the scope of the National Strategy.

Finally, the act also required that an advisory committee on the prevention of poverty and social exclusion be set up at the provincial level to advise the minister on the planning, implementation, and evaluation of actions taken under the National Strategy. This advisory committee was established in March 2006 and consists of 17 members — five members from representative bodies or groups involved in the fight against poverty and social exclusion, 10 members from the management, organized labour, municipal, community and other sectors of civil society, and two members from the public service who are not entitled to vote. The committee reports to the minister annually and makes its advice, advisory opinions, and recommendations public 10 days after transmitting them to the minister.

The Quebec approach to poverty and social exclusion is therefore enshrined in law, set out in a strategy, implemented through an action plan, carried out within an expanded governance framework that includes an independent advisory committee and an independently managed research and evaluation centre, subject to accountability, open and transparent, and monitored using statistical indicators.21 This integrated legislative approach was a first in Canada, but has been implemented in France and Belgium.22 Newfoundland and Labrador became the second province in Canada to adopt a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy in 2006.23

The Quebec example therefore addresses many of the issues that hampered the NHI in its horizontal coordination:

The Social Exclusion Task Force in the UK illustrates another approach to poverty and social exclusion in a different context and with a different history. In the 1990s, most of the successes in coordination across departments to address issues of social exclusion had taken place at the local level. At the policy level, there was less of a history of horizontal coordination. Different departments stressed different aspects — income, crime and disorder, health, and job creation. Only the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) had a place-based focus and stressed the need to look at multiple problems on an area basis.24

With a new Labour government elected in 1997, a Social Exclusion Unit was created, closely linked to the Prime Minister but located initially in DETR, then in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and then briefly in the newly created Department of Communities and Local Government.25 The Unit pursued three initial areas of public policy — the worst housing estates, leading to the creation of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, provision for people sleeping rough, leading to the creation of the Rough Sleepers Unit, and the problem of truancy. It also incorporated a social inclusion perspective into the substantive policies of Departments. In all, the Unit produced over 40 reports during its existence.

A Social Exclusion Task Force was set up in Cabinet Office in June 2006, drawing together the expertise of some staff from the former Social Exclusion Unit and policy specialists from the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. The Task Force was initially headed by a Minister for Social Exclusion, appointed to spearhead a renewed drive to address the most socially excluded in society and reporting to a Cabinet Committee on Social Exclusion. The Social Exclusion Minister was also Minister for the Cabinet Office.

With the change in Prime Ministers from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown in 2007, there is no longer a Minister for Social Exclusion; the Task Force is now headed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office and it reports to the Cabinet Subcommittee on Social Exclusion, which is under the Cabinet Committee on Life Chances,26 chaired by the Prime Minister. The budget for the Task Force in 2007/08 is £2 million with a staff of 19 people.

The Task Force focuses on those groups who are most at risk and hard to reach, including children in care, people with mental health problems, teenagers at risk of pregnancy, and families with complex problems. It promotes five guiding principles for all of government:

  1. Better identification and earlier intervention
  2. The systematic identification of what works and the dissemination of best practices,
  3. multi-agency working through local authorities, sharing data, and sharing information on costs
  4. Personalization, rights and responsibilities — piloting of service delivery based on budget-holding lead professionals and on brokering in order to tailor services around the needs of individuals and families, extending tariffs for the delivery of particular outcomes, and negotiating compacts with at-risk families and individuals
  5. Supporting achievement and managing underperformance in service providers across government and in local authorities.

The Task Force itself does not deliver any services on the ground, but supports other departments undertaking pilot schemes, the reform of systems and services, and research. It therefore operates at the policy level rather than the program or service level

An Action Plan on Social Exclusion was published in September 2006. It outlines principles for a renewed approach and a series of immediate changes and pilots focused on the most-excluded groups. Annual progress reports are provided on implementation of the Plan. A wider 10-year strategic review is under way to look at the long-term drivers of social exclusion and government responses. Both the Action Plan and the 10-year review are informed by stakeholder engagement and discussion, within and outside of government. The Task Force has also contributed to cross-government Public Service Agreements addressing the unique needs of the most socially excluded.

Public Service Agreements (PSAs) were introduced in the UK in 1998. They are linked to the key priorities of the government for a three-year spending period. Initially, the PSAs were related to individual departments, with very few cross-cutting themes. There were also hundreds of targets, primarily related to outputs but also to inputs and processes. Following a Comprehensive Funding Review in 2007, the number of PSAs and targets was reduced, the focus was shifted to key outcomes, and they deal primarily with cross-cutting issues.

The 30 PSAs for the 2008-2011 period are organized around four key themes:

  1. Sustainable growth and prosperity (PSAs 1–7)
  2. Fairness and opportunity for all (PSAs 8–17)
  3. Stronger communities and a better quality of life (PSAs 18–26)
  4. A more secure, fair and environmentally sustainable world (PSAs 27–30).

There is no one PSA for social exclusion, but aspects of the issue are addressed under a number of PSAs in the second and third theme areas — for example, PSA Delivery Agreement 14 sets out actions that the government will take for an integrated response to increase the number of children and young people on the path to success.

Each PSA consists of a vision, performance indicators, and a delivery strategy identifying delivery partners, priority actions, and accountability and governance at the central and local government level. A lead minister is nominated for each PSA and the relevant cabinet committee(s) monitors progress, holds departments and programs to account, and resolves interdepartmental disputes where they arise. A PSA delivery board of senior officials comprised of all lead and supporting departments is also established, which monitors progress and reviews delivery regularly. Each Department remains responsible for developing and meeting its Departmental Strategic Objectives covering the full breadth of its work.

The Social Exclusion Task Force therefore illustrates a couple of interesting innovations:

In Ontario, a successful example of horizontal coordination is the Cabinet Committee on Race Relations (CCRR). The CCRR existed from 1979 to 1990 and had a special mandate to develop policies to respond to concerns about racism and discrimination against racial minorities. For most of its history, it was chaired by the Attorney General. After 1987, it was chaired by the Minister of Citizenship. The committee included ministers from seven other ministries. The CCRR was supported by a secretary in Cabinet Office and a working group of policy persons from all of the member ministries. For at least part of its history, there was also a deputies’ committee composed of deputy ministers from the member ministries. Senior staff from the Human Rights Commission and its Race Relations Division also participated.

The committee relied heavily on the working group, the policy branch in the Ministry of the Attorney General, the use of inter-ministerial task forces on particular subjects and on the expertise located in the ministry or ministries whose mandate(s) were directly affected by the issue being addressed. The committee occasionally heard from community delegations and staff would engage community representatives in some of the projects.

The Cabinet committee developed policies on a wide range of issues of direct importance to race relations that resulted in Cabinet submissions that were brought to and endorsed by Cabinet. These issues included: racial diversity in government advertising and communications, publicly assisted housing, access to the trades and professions, the racial composition of the civil service, the composition of boards and commissions, curriculum and other changes in the school system, policing, race relations training in government and key public institutions, and the participation of visible minority youth in job creation, training, and apprenticeship programs.

With a change in government in 1990, the Cabinet Committee on Race Relations ceased to exist. Subsequently, after a report on racism submitted by Stephen Lewis, a new Cabinet Round Table on Anti-Racism was formed that functioned for a fairly short period of time. It was an advisory committee rather than a Cabinet committee and monitored the government’s progress in implementing the recommendations of the Report on Racism. It was supported by a small staff group in the Anti-Racism Secretariat in the Ministry of Citizenship.

The Cabinet Committee on Race Relations represented a unique approach to a specific government policy priority and its successes can be attributed to a number of factors:

  1. It had direct access to Cabinet in one defined policy area and was able to access funding for initiatives from the Management Board.
  2. It had strong chairs and committee members.
  3. The working group had capable policy persons on it, with direct access to ministers and deputies because their work was for a Cabinet committee.
  4. It was proactive in identifying and doing initial work on issues it identified.

On the other hand, the committee’s success may have been tempered by the fact that it did not have the personnel to do continuing, in-depth research or to monitor the effectiveness of the policies it approved. It relied on individual ministries to implement policies that were implemented, and for the most part there was no formal method of holding ministries accountable to the committee for achieving agreed-upon outcomes. It also had no guaranteed access to funding.

The committee’s work was also not totally analogous to the work of the Review of the Roots of Youth Violence. Although some of its work affected publicly funded institutions — such as the police and publicly assisted housing — it was primarily focused on provincial government policy, and communities were not involved unless included in a particular task force. Its primary focus was on individual areas of policy development rather than on comprehensive long-term policy goals.

Vertical Coordination

Examples Used Order of Government
Vertical Initiatives
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada National/Provincial/Local
National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion, Quebec Provincial/Regional/Local
Vancouver Agreement National/Provincial/Local

The National Homelessness Initiative was weak in terms of coordination with the provinces. Consultations were held with the provinces and territories from 1999 to 2000 on issues such as the communities to be funded, the allocation of the funding, and project sustainability — but the provinces and territories preferred a multilateral federal/provincial/territorial (F/P/T) process to explore fundamental social policy and funding priorities. The federal government wanted to act quickly and took the position that the NHI was not a national program but rather a time-limited, targeted, demonstration initiative. The Initiative was therefore launched without P/T agreement and negotiations continued on a bilateral basis with each province and territory after the announcement.

Negotiations with each province centred on agreement that the Government of Canada could invest directly in the province’s municipalities. Provinces protested that this approach to negotiation was not in the spirit of the Social Union Framework Agreement, and that the federal government’s focus on “absolute homelessness” was too narrow since it excluded the issue of affordable housing.27 Eventually all of the provinces agreed, and a separate agreement was negotiated with the Province of Quebec.

During implementation, provincial governments were generally represented at the community tables approving community housing plans and individual projects to be funded, but with a few exceptions, they did not provide any additional resources or connect and fine-tune their own existing programs. Although funding from the federal government for communities had to be matched by other resources, these other resources generally came from already existing investments by the provincial or municipal governments. The federal funding did not therefore leverage much new monies, despite that being the original intention.

NHI’s coordination with the provinces was constrained by the following factors:

With the election of the new Conservative government, the National Homelessness Initiative was changed into a two-year Homelessness Partnering Strategy in April 2007. The Strategy will apparently focus more on partnerships with the provinces and territories to improve linkages between federal programs and P/T social services, although federal funding continues to flow directly to community entities while partnership agreements are being negotiated.

The National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion in Quebec is interesting because it is led by a provincial government. Part of the Strategy was to negotiate with the federal government for more financial support. An agreement was reached for the transfer of parental leave employment insurance funds from the federal government to Quebec to finance the Quebec Parental Insurance Plan, but we could find no other indication of increased federal funding.

Collaboration between the provincial and federal governments is hampered by longstanding disputes over federal fiscal transfers to the provinces and territories in areas of provincial jurisdiction, with or without conditions, and cash transfers from the federal government directly to individuals or institutions, also in areas of provincial jurisdiction.28 The Province of Quebec’s position is that there has to be formal consent from the province for any initiative in its territory in an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, together with the right to opt out and receive financial compensation from the federal government.29 There is an indication in the most recent Speech from the Throne that the federal government is willing to place formal limits on the use of federal spending power for new shared-cost programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction and allow provinces and territories to opt out with reasonable compensation if they offer compatible programs.30

The other aspect of the Quebec example that is interesting is that of regional and local coordination. The Action Plan provided for an integrated territorial approach at both a regional and a local level. The province is organized into 17 regions or territories, 86 regional county municipalities, and two metropolitan communities (Montreal and Quebec City). Regional Conferences of Elected Officials (CREs) have been set up for regional and local planning and prioritizing — not just in relation to social exclusion, but also in relation to all provincial programs and services. The elected officials are from the county and municipal governments in the region.

The CREs are in the process of developing cooperative strategies with their various regional partners — including organizations representing the poor — regarding regional priorities and areas requiring more intensive action. Local and regional agreements based on the strategies are being negotiated with the provincial government, and as of April 2007, 10 such agreements were in place. Agreements with the Cree, the Inuit of Nunavik and with the Innu nation in the province have also been negotiated. Vertical coordination at the regional and local level is therefore being implemented as part of an overall strategy related to regional and local decentralization and negotiated with new regional governing structures that are democratically representative.

Probably the best-known example of vertical coordination in Canada is the Vancouver Agreement (VA). The Agreement is one of a number of urban development agreements that have been negotiated in Western Canada,31 but one that took a public health approach to economic development with an initial focus on the Downtown Eastside. It was signed on March 9, 2000 by the federal government, the provincial government and the City of Vancouver. It offers interesting insights into the sorts of processes and structures that are used for vertical coordination and into their efficiency and effectiveness.

The Vancouver Agreement aims to increase coordination among the three orders of government and related agencies, within their jurisdictions and mandates and with communities in Vancouver.32 It provides for the development and implementation of a coordinated strategy, with an implementation schedule including activities, timelines, and financial commitments. It also provides for community engagement to advise on gaps in services and programs, community priorities, and strategies and action plans.

A Proposed Downtown Eastside Strategy was appended to the Agreement, which identified goals, objectives, principles, processes and components. The three components were: Community Health and Safety, Economic and Social Development, and Community Capacity Building. An Integrated Strategic Plan was not released until March 2002 — two years after signing the Agreement. It defined 31 strategies and actions under four headings: revitalize the Hastings Street Corridor, dismantle the open drug scene, turn problem hotels into contributor hotels, and make the community healthier and safer for the most vulnerable.

For the first three years, the Agreement did not have any designated funding but relied on existing funds. By 2003, projects worth nearly $50 million had been announced “under the Vancouver Agreement’s objectives,” and many additional projects were also considered to have contributed to the VA goals but were developed and announced under different programs (e.g., NHI funding for homelessness). In 2003, the federal and provincial governments each contributed $10 million to implement the Agreement’s Integrated Strategic Plan, and an additional $5.7 million was subsequently contributed by the provincial government. This funding was intended to be used to supplement existing funds or to fund priority projects that would otherwise not be funded. The City of Vancouver contributes in-kind goods and services, including office space and staff as well as funding for capital projects.

Twelve federal departments are involved, led by Western Economic Diversification Canada. Nineteen provincial ministries or agencies are also involved, as well as 14 municipal departments. We looked at planning, budgeting, and reporting documents in each order of government and could find no indication of horizontal coordination across departments at the federal, provincial, or municipal level. A finding by the Auditor General of Canada in 2005 probably applies equally to each order of government — there was active and ongoing federal engagement in intergovernmental committees and ongoing support from officials in three federal government departments, but it was not clear who was involved from the federal side, how they were involved, or what the criteria were to report on certain projects as being “in the spirit of the Agreement.”33

In terms of vertical coordination, regular meetings of the three orders of government are held at a number of levels, ranging from elected public officials to mid-level civil servants. The governing body is the Policy Committee, consisting of the federal Minister of Western Economic Diversification, the provincial Minister of Community Services, and the Mayor of Vancouver. This committee has ultimate responsibility for decision-making and accountability, and decisions are made by consensus. In practice, the committee meets about twice a year.

A Management Committee reports to the Policy Committee and consists of senior officials of the lead provincial ministries and federal and municipal departments. It is responsible for intergovernmental relationships, external communication, monitoring and evaluation, investment decisions, and oversight of operational activities. It meets every two months. One problem in both the Policy Committee and the Management Committee is the frequent use of alternates, thereby slowing decision-making and weakening continuity.34

The Vancouver Agreement Coordination Unit provides secretariat services to both committees, oversees the day-to-day management of the Agreement, and consists of seven staff headed by an executive coordinator. There are a number of task teams that work on various issues, consisting of a staff member from the Coordination Unit, liaison persons for each order of government, and community members in some cases. It is at this level that most of the work under the Vancouver Agreement is conducted and most of the coordination takes place.

The main problem for the task teams is that they have little delegated authority and therefore have to frequently refer back to their own departments for instructions or approvals. It also proved to be more difficult than anticipated to use existing departmental program funds to support VA projects because of their terms and conditions. For example, HRDC funding support had to be used for the disabled or youth — criteria that were often not suited to the target groups in the Downtown Eastside.35

One case study in 2004 observed that the transactional costs of the Vancouver Agreement for the three parties may have outweighed its benefits. These costs were mainly related to the time spent in numerous meetings and the delays in getting the necessary approvals from different departments. It also noted that many of the activities that took place under the rubric of the VA would likely have taken place in any event, but without the additional administrative burden — the one exception being the use of Western Economic Diversification funding for a public health approach to economic development.36

There was not a high level of community engagement in any systematic way under the Agreement. Two of the City’s programs — the Downtown Eastside Community Development Project and the Four Pillars Coalition — did involve Downtown Eastside residents. There were however antagonisms between groups that claimed to represent various constituencies, and the City questioned the representativeness of some of these groups. Non-profit organizations delivering social services were well regarded. Participation by the Aboriginal population remained a challenge and there was a multiplicity of groups claiming to represent Aboriginal interests — “a fragmentation of voice accentuated by fractured federal-provincial responsibilities.”

The Agreement was renewed for a second phase in March 2005. The three key priorities for the second phase are:

  1. Vancouver’s Inner City Communities — including but not limited to the Downtown Eastside
  2. 2010 Inner City Inclusivity Initiative — to ensure inner-city neighbourhoods benefit from the Olympic Winter Games through “legacies” such as employment and training, business opportunities, housing, and community sports and culture
  3. Accessible/Inclusive Cities and Communities Project — to provide greater opportunities for people with disabilities.

It is difficult to assess the success of the Vancouver Agreement in the absence of clear and measurable outcomes, monitoring, and reporting. A study done for the Management Committee in 2003 indicated that the VA had succeeded in forging shared objectives and developing an integrated strategic plan. Agencies or programs were working together in ways that had not happened before the VA. For example, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, HRDC, BC’s employment standards branch, the Vancouver Police Department, and municipal building inspectors collaborated to solve problem hotels. Also, the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and the Vancouver Police Department coordinated their efforts to set up a safe injection site program for drug users.

The study highlighted four issues in relation to governance:37

  1. No clear decision-making criteria for VA management decisions and decisions about what projects to bring under the VA’s umbrella.
  2. No holistic approach to community involvement.
  3. The VA’s model of distributive authority — with each partner working within its own jurisdiction, mandate and budget — as opposed to a model of delegated authority with a separate entity to manage expenditure from a separate fund. The study did not however recommend one model over the other.
  4. The lack of distinction between project outcomes and outcomes of the partnership itself, and no evaluation of the VA itself.

Another study of the Vancouver Agreement assessed it in terms of five successful characteristics of area-based urban partnerships with socially inclusive development goals — with mixed results:38

  1. Resource pooling: The VA did not pool resources, but instead chose a model of more flexible financing across the three governments, although dedicated funds were provided to the City by the provincial and federal governments after the initial three years.
  2. Leadership: There was high-level political leadership in all three governments, and champions within the senior bureaucracies: the assistant deputy ministers of participating federal and provincial agencies, the chief executive officer of Vancouver Coastal Health and the chief of the Vancouver Police Department.
  3. Community involvement: There had not been a high level of community engagement.
  4. Mutual learning: Participants in the VA from each tier of government identified learning as a key dynamic and outcome, primarily within and across task teams through working relationships and interactions.

Horizontal accountability through monitoring and reporting program outcomes: This was not evident in the first phase of the Agreement, but had apparently been addressed when it was renewed in 2005. We could find no evidence of this.

Community-Based Initiatives

Community-Based Initiatives
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada National/Provincial/Local
Local Strategic Partnerships, UK National/Local
Neighbourhood Action, Toronto Local
Community Safety and Crime Prevention Council, Waterloo Community
Community Action, Quebec Provincial/Community

The main component of the National Homelessness Initiative was the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative (SCPI), which provided a total of $563 million in funding to communities to work with governments and the private and voluntary sectors to make more services and facilities available to the homeless. A total of 61 communities were supported, with 80% of the total funds dedicated to the 10 most affected cities. Federal funding was linked to the development of community plans that identified and addressed needs and gaps over the immediate and long term. Communities received funding to cover their planning costs, as well as up to 50% of the cost of eligible projects in the community plan.

The community homelessness plan was considered to be one of the key factors for success in collaboration, since it brought together stakeholders, examined assets and gaps, and made the selection of priorities more legitimate in the eyes of the public.39 At the same time, it required a lot of time to develop and strong direction from HRDC or the municipality. In the larger communities, 50 or more organizations might participate initially, with 20 to 30 organizations staying active throughout.40

There were two models for the management and delivery of the SCPI at the community level that the community could choose between.

  1. Community entity model. A community entity was chosen by the community in consultation with HRDC. This entity could be the municipality or an incorporated organization. The community entity was responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of the community plan and deciding which projects should be funded. It was also responsible for ensuring an inclusive community planning process and transparency in decision-making and administrative processes and practices.

    HRDC then negotiated a contribution agreement to transfer all of the federal funding to this entity. The community entity in turn negotiated individual project agreements with various community organizations or groups for approved projects. The projects were recommended for funding by a community advisory board.
  2. Shared delivery model. HRDC staff, in partnership with community groups, coordinated the development of the community plan, approved projects and negotiated project agreements. The community advisory board still recommended what projects should be funded, and the Minister of HRDC had to give final approval.

Two-thirds of the communities in the first phase of the NHI selected the shared delivery model and one-third of the communities selected the community entity model. In the latter case, two-thirds of the community entities were municipalities.

An evaluation of the NHI in 2003 indicated that in the majority of the 61 communities, homelessness had not been addressed in a coordinated way and it was not a municipal priority. In those communities, the establishment of a community entity to manage and administer the SCPI was not considered feasible by most community members for the following reasons:

The evaluation found that having a choice in terms of the best delivery model given the local context and capacity was a positive design feature. The evaluation did not however find any evidence that one particular governance model was more effective than the other in meeting community and federal objectives. Instead, the critical factors in determining progress included:

The composition and selection of the community advisory boards varied across the various communities. In most of the communities, new committee and subcommittee structures were created to deal with homelessness in general and specific sectors in particular (Aboriginal, addictions and mental health, youth, seniors, transitional housing, etc.) These structures discussed needs and the allocation of available resources. In about half of the communities — particularly the larger ones — “funders’tables” were also created to coordinate governmental and non-governmental funders. For example:

One of the key instruments to promote collaboration at the local level was the creation of a new role for a federal employee (or employees) in each of the communities — the “community facilitator.”44 The community facilitators attended meetings, provided advice, coordinated with the NHI Secretariat in Ottawa and supported the community governance structure. In some cases, the community facilitators had to take leadership on some issues. Facilitators were also appointed by the provincial and municipal governments in some provinces, such as Alberta.

The example with the highest delegation of authority and responsibility to the community level is the Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in the UK. LSPs were created under the Local Government Act 2000 and are single non-statutory multi-agency bodies aligned with local authority boundaries. LSPs bring together organizations like the health service, the police service, the fire service, local and regional government, business, and voluntary and community organizations. Although they are not required by law, certain types of funding require that they be established — e.g., the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. LSPs exist in all areas of England, covering unitary and two-tier local authorities.45

The core tasks of the LSPs are:

In summary, LSPs are responsible for setting the long-term vision, integrated planning, community engagement and monitoring. Local councils are expected to play a leadership role in the LSP and often chair it. The plans and LAAs generated by the LSPs have to be formalized by the local authority or one of the LSP partners. The organization and composition of LSPs are up to the community to decide. They typically do not have many staff or large budgets of their own and local authorities often provide most or all of the administration.

Local Area Agreements are three-year, negotiated agreements between local authorities and central government. They were piloted in 2004, are being rolled out across England from 2007/08, and will be a statutory requirement soon. The Agreements set out a series of targets that the council must achieve and the funding streams the central government will pay to the council. There are also enabling measures — changes that the central government agrees for a particular area to help it meet its targets. Some targets are stretch targets and reward money (Performance Reward Grants) is given for meeting them. Increasingly, Local Area Agreements will have a “single pot” rather than separate funding streams. Local authorities will then have the freedom to spend the funding on achieving any of the outcomes agreed as part of the LAA.

Community networks are often developed alongside LSPs so that community groups, residents’ organizations and voluntary organizations can coordinate themselves. Community networks in the neighbourhood renewal areas receive special funding to assist their formation and operation. Funds have been provided by several departments in the central government for community and voluntary sector engagement at the local level. From 2005, these funds were consolidated into a single Safer and Stronger Communities Fund. A National Community Forum advises central government on how local communities can be effectively involved in local government initiatives.

An evaluation of the LSPs in 2004 indicated that in a relatively short time, they had established themselves as a vital part of the institutional arrangements of modernized local governance.46 Governance arrangements that were effective and inclusive depended on a number of factors, including:

Similar partnerships are being developed in Toronto at a neighbourhood level, initiated by the municipal government. Neighbourhood Action is an initiative directed by the City of Toronto’s Community Safety Plan and Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy and is designed to increase community infrastructure, programs, and services in 13 priority neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood Action Teams have been established in each of the neighbourhoods, composed of City local service managers. Core divisional and City board participation includes:

The purpose of the NATs is to ensure cross-divisional knowledge, leading to better horizontal needs identification, service planning, and city service delivery at the neighbourhood level. In the first phase, City services and resources located in the neighbourhood were identified and priorities and outcomes developed. In the next phase, the membership of the NATs is being expanded to include broader community stakeholders that are active in priority areas and piloting initiatives identified at NAT tables. In many of the neighbourhoods, NATs are developing into Neighbourhood Action Partnerships (NAPs) and including residents, other orders of government, the United Way, and school boards. As of December 2007, Councillors are also to be engaged in NAPs.

Each NAT is led by a director from the Toronto Community Housing Corporation or another City department. Administrative support is provided by the Social Development Finance and Administration division of the City. An Interdivisional Committee on Integrated Responses for Priority Neighbourhoods, comprised of senior divisional managers, provides overall coordination. The federal and provincial governments have observers on the committee.

The Community Safety and Crime Prevention Council of Waterloo Region provides another example of a community-based partnership. The Council was set up by the Waterloo Regional Council in 1994 to act as a key community resource for the prevention of crime and the promotion of public safety and security. It brings together representatives from justice and law enforcement agencies and services, regional and municipal governments, community-based health and social service agencies, the private sector, and faith-based organizations to close the gaps between service silos and to identify new directions to address the root causes of crime. It has a modest budget, its office space is provided by the Regional Municipality, and the Waterloo Regional Police and community partners provide support. The National Crime Prevention Centre has also provided project funding.

The Council’s key activities are:

Community Engagement Coordinators of the Council work directly with the community to find and implement creative solutions to community safety issues and provide a link to key community resources including residents, neighbourhood associations, funders, agencies, faith groups, police, governments, and schools. The Council itself meets monthly to discuss various issues and to monitor progress and solutions.

As the NHI illustrated, the community entities that take the lead in coordinating at a community level may not be municipal governments, but rather a community-based non-governmental organization. The Quebec government has explicitly recognized the contribution of these organizations to Quebec’s social and economic development by adopting the Community Action Policy in 2001.47 Community action organizations are non-profit organizations that are community-based and pursuing a social mission, such as fighting against poverty, discrimination, and social exclusion48. There are close to 5,000 such organizations in Quebec, and 56% of their funding comes from the Quebec government, 7% from federal or municipal governments, and 37% from private donations or fees. Quebec is unique in treating this sector separately from other non-profit organizations or civil society as a whole.

The policy aims to harmonize the administrative practices and various funding mechanisms related to supporting community action. Three streams of funding are provided for:

  1. Core funding — support provided in a lump sum to support the operating costs of the independent community action organizations over a number of years. It is intended to complement other sources of funding.
  2. Service agreements — contracts for the delivery of services by community action organizations that complement public services.
  3. Ad hoc or short-term projects — each department or agency of the provincial government remains responsible for the terms and conditions governing access to this kind of financial support and for assessing the relevance of the projects.

The provincial government also provides non-financial support to community action organizations related to recruitment and training. It is committed to harmonizing and simplifying its accountability and other administrative procedures, and to adapting the procedures to the nature of the funding and the features of the organization (i.e., size, budget, etc.) Evaluation means, mechanisms, procedures and indicators are to be developed in collaboration with the community sector itself.

The policy is being implemented through an action plan and national guidelines for government departments and agencies.49 Administrative agreements with each ministry or agency implicated by the action plan have also been negotiated, covering a three-year period. The Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity has overall responsibility for the policy and a Secretariat within that ministry provides administrative support and advice as well as collecting statistics on government support to community action organizations. There is an interdepartmental community action committee of 20 government departments and agencies, and an advisory committee of the 16 community sectors (e.g., youth, housing, recreation, immigrants and ethnic communities) and four multi-sectoral groupings.

Total funding for community organizations in 2006/07 was $666.7 million. Of this amount, 65% was core funding provided to about 85% of the organizations, 28% for service agreements, and 7% for short-term projects. The amount of core funding has steadily increased over the past five years. The Ministry of Health and Social Services was responsible for 55.5% of the value of the transfers and Employment Quebec for 22.55%.50

As part of the policy, a fund to assist independent community action was established to support rights advocacy organizations, community development corporations,51 and multi-sectoral organizations. This fund was financed primarily through Loto Quebec and is administered by the secretariat in MESS. The total amount transferred in 2006/07 through this fund was $19.3 million. The Social and Community Initiative Support Program of the National Poverty and Social Exclusion Strategy is also administered by the same secretariat. It provided $4.9 million in transfers in 2006/07.52

The policy is in the process of being evaluated in preparation for its revision. According to a survey conducted in 2005, there are two key aspects of the policy that have been most appreciated by organizations:53

  1. The provision of core funding: The core funding has stabilized and improved the situation in most community action organizations. The amount is however not considered to be sufficient, and newer and smaller organizations have difficulty accessing the funds.
  2. The consolidation of funding related to a particular sector and certain organizations into one ministry: For example, core funding for community development corporations has been consolidated in MESS. This fosters closer relationships between the government department and the organization, improves accountability and oversight, and reduces the duplication of reporting requirements.

Conclusion

A coordinated response to the roots of youth violence is appropriate given the nature of the issue — complex, crossing organizational boundaries and orders of government, and place-based. This would require not only the sharing of information and cooperation in undertaking activities, but also more sharing of authority, resources, and results, and ultimately the delegation of some responsibilities and resources linked to a shared vision.

From a governance perspective, such a response should be based on five principles:

  1. Ensuring legitimacy and giving voice to all of those affected
  2. Providing a clear direction
  3. Driving performance
  4. Ensuring accountability and transparency
  5. Treating all those involved fairly and equitably.

There are however strong barriers to increased coordination — structural, bureaucratic, political and internal.

The barriers to horizontal coordination are primarily of a bureaucratic and political nature. They include a lack of political and senior management leadership, no clear direction, no overall accountability framework and no interdepartmental accountability agreements, the absence of clear performance measures, inadequate resources, and no consolidation or alignment of funding mechanisms. The National Homelessness Initiative illustrates most of these barriers.

Mechanisms to overcome these barriers include:

The National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion in Quebec illustrates most of these mechanisms, and the Public Service Agreements in the UK provide an example of the sort of interdepartmental agreements that could be negotiated on cross-cutting issues, with a clear delivery strategy.

A variety of structures have been used to implement these mechanisms, including:

The barriers to vertical coordination across orders of government are of a political, bureaucratic and structural nature. The political barriers are similar to those of horizontal coordination — i.e., no sustained commitment at the political and senior management levels. The bureaucratic barriers are also similar — no clear direction, no overall accountability, no intergovernmental accountability, inadequate resources, and no consolidated or aligned funding mechanisms. The National Homelessness Initiative and the Vancouver Agreement provide examples of most of these bureaucratic barriers.

Vertical coordination in Canada appears to be most constrained by structural barriers, however. These barriers include poor intergovernmental relations, the fiscal imbalance between the federal and provincial governments and between provincial governments and their municipal governments, federal spending in areas of provincial jurisdiction, and the unclear roles and responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments in relation to Aboriginals. There are mechanisms and structures that have been established to address these issues at both a federal and provincial level, but they are beyond the scope of any single initiative or cross-cutting issue.

The mechanisms for addressing the political and bureaucratic barriers are similar to the mechanisms listed under horizontal coordination, with a few variations to take into account the different levels of government involved. These mechanisms include:

Some of the structures that have been used to increase coordination across governments — particularly in terms of the Vancouver Agreement — include:

Coordination in a vertical arrangement therefore seemed to be best achieved on the ground, through people from each order of government working together in teams on projects and issues. This being the case, it was important to delegate sufficient authority and resources to these people and task teams so that they could perform efficiently and effectively.

This type of coordination had high transaction costs, however, due to the number of meetings and the number of people involved. The costs versus the benefits therefore need to be carefully considered for any initiative involving more than one order of government. Alternatively, responsibility, authority, and resources from one or more orders of government could be delegated to a single community entity to manage — as was done in the case of the NHI. This would reduce the transaction costs, but could weaken the links to other government activities that might be relevant.

Much of the successful horizontal and vertical coordination in Canada on place-based crosscutting issues occurs at the community level through community-based organizations or municipal governments. Although there has been some delegation of authority to the community level to plan and manage the implementation of projects and activities that are funded by higher orders of government, there are a number of constraints affecting coordination. These include:

Measures and related structures to improve coordination at the community level that came out in our examples were:

The Local Strategic Partnerships in the UK and the Neighbourhood Action Partnerships in Toronto provide more detail on these sorts of measures in terms of local government primarily. Quebec’s Community Action Policy provides more detail on a potential approach specifically related to community-based organizations.

In summary, in order to address the roots of youth violence, there is a need to coordinate policies, priorities, and programs at a number of levels — across all three orders of government, across different departments within each order of government, and at the community level. Community-based coordination needs to involve both governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies, as well to engage youth, residents, and other groups. Increased delegation, the formation of partnerships and new funding mechanisms are required at the community level in order to foster this coordination.

Implications for Ontario

Feedback on Critical Success Factors

The critical success factors for horizontal, vertical, and community-based coordination were presented to a focus group of deputy ministers and a focus group of community representatives in order to solicit their views and discuss how those factors might be applied in the Ontario context. The purpose of the focus groups was not to make decisions, but rather to explore the issues and come up with possible options.

In general, both focus groups agreed with the critical success factors that are identified in this report. Both focus groups also emphasized the need to work concurrently at a provincial level and at a community level. The involvement of the federal government was considered to be less critical or more problematic.

More detail on each of the focus groups is provided below.

Deputy Ministers’ Focus Group

The deputy ministers were drawn from a number of relevant ministries and had experience working on horizontal initiatives, both in Ontario and in other provinces, as well as some knowledge and experience in the UK. They suggested that the focus of horizontal coordination at the provincial government level should be on the development of a policy framework, policy coordination and the definition of outcomes, leaving specific ministries to implement various initiatives. They indicated that there would need to be a governance body at a fairly high level to achieve this.

When asked whether a special Cabinet committee would be the best structure at the political level to monitor results, hold ministries to account and suggest re-direction, the deputies suggested that a “results team” might be a better option given the approach of the present government. These results teams report to the Premier and are made up of senior executives and external experts. Results teams currently exist for health, education, and most recently, climate change. Experts could assist with the development of outcomes and provide a methodology and outside legitimacy for the selection of outcomes and communities of focus. Independent monitoring and public reporting might also add legitimacy and ensure that ministries kept on track over the longer term.

The deputies noted that the Cabinet Committee on Poverty Reduction will be developing a policy framework, outcomes, indicators, targets, and a strategy for reducing child poverty and lifting more families out of poverty. This committee is chaired by the Minister of Children and Youth Services and consists of 14 ministers or parliamentary assistants, supported by a small unit in Cabinet Office of about six persons. Responsibility for implementation and monitoring of the policy has yet to be determined.

The deputies advised that the Ministry of Children and Youth Services has been assigned responsibility for responding to the Review of the Roots of Youth Violence report. They agreed on the need for a “driver” to pull all of the threads or ministries together and to be assigned overall responsibility — it was suggested that the lead ministry could be selected based on whatever the biggest “root” of the roots of youth violence was — e.g., education, health, justice, etc. It was noted that marginalized youth often have no natural advocate in the government and they need a designated minister to bring their voice to the table. The lead ministry could hold other ministries to account and be accountable to the public, and there could be rewards for good performance or sanctions for poor performance.

In terms of vertical and community-based coordination, the deputy ministers saw benefit in allowing the community coordination mechanism or partnership to emerge “organically” rather than requiring a particular model. They also thought it was important to build on what already exists. They thought that the community entity would not necessarily need to be part of or directly connected to the municipal government, although local government would clearly need to be involved. In some communities, coordination might need to be encouraged — as, for example, has been done with a recent call for pilot proposals to coordinate the community-based governance of services to new immigrants. The ability to collect and share best practice across various communities and various community entities was thought to be key.

The deputies suggested that provincial funding to community partnerships could be provided based on clear objectives, outcomes, targets and client groups rather than specific services. Communities would then have the flexibility to take different approaches. The Service Accountability Agreements between the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care and the Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs) were referred to as an example of the sort of outcomes-based agreement that could be negotiated with community entities. In terms of these Service Accountability Agreements, the ministry retains responsibility for overall planning of the health system and sets the performance framework for the LHINs. Each LHIN then engages with local stakeholders, identifies needs, prepares an integrated strategic plan, and sets its own performance objectives and targets consistent with the provincial framework.

Separate pots of provincial funding could be merged where possible, but this was not considered to be absolutely necessary, particularly at the outset. Funding to community partnerships could also serve as a platform for additional investment by various sectors, such as health.

The preference of the deputies was for the transfer of federal resources through the provincial government rather than the negotiation of tripartite agreements. It was noted that the three levels of government have very different cultures — the federal government wants to talk at a high policy level, whereas municipalities deal with more practical matters such as getting youth to go to school. The deputies thought that if the province provided a concerted investment, then the federal government might get involved if it fitted with their priorities and interests. The rationale for involving the federal government would have to be clear — e.g., would it be just for their funding or for their knowledge and expertise?

Community Representatives’ Focus Group

The community representatives came from a variety of non-governmental organizations involved with children and youth, families, ethnic communities, mental health, and community safety, as well as from a couple of foundations, one municipality, and two school boards. They had experience working together on a number of projects and initiatives, and also experience working with three or four levels of government (federal, provincial, regional, and municipal).

In terms of horizontal and vertical coordination, the community representatives agreed on:

It was suggested that the structure at the provincial level should mirror the partnership at the community level.

In terms of community-based coordination, the community representatives agreed on:

The community representatives also agreed that there should be flexibility in terms of selecting the community entity to coordinate a partnership. It was suggested that this entity should be skilled and provide leadership, and that the issue should be part of its mission and mandate. Successful models of partnerships and community leaders in a number of communities, including Toronto and Kitchener-Waterloo, were referred to, and it was suggested that these should be built on. Funding was recommended for this coordination function — although core funding may be modest, it was considered important. The coordinating entity should have a clear mandate and might not want to continue to deliver services itself if it is managing and allocating funding to others. Trust and relationship-building was recommended as the initial focus and the basis of the partnership.

Challenges

We have identified a number of challenges, in the Ontario context, to introducing the types of governance models, mechanisms and structures that we found in our examples. These include:

These challenges need to be considered further when selecting the best option in terms of governance for the recommendations of the Review.

Governance Options

The definition of an appropriate governance system or framework depends first of all on what is being governed, and secondly on the different players and the context within which it takes place. Our advice for the Review of the Roots of Youth Violence on the governance options or cluster of options for Ontario in the current and foreseeable future is therefore constrained by two key considerations:

  1. The Review has not finalized its recommendations and therefore it is still not known what will need to be governed.
  2. The focus groups provided some insight into the Ontario context, but we did not undertaken a comprehensive review of the current situation in Ontario related to the issues under consideration by the Review. Our focus was on examples from other jurisdictions or for similar cross-cutting issues in order to gain insight into critical success factors and possible governance approaches that could be taken.

The following discussion of governance options therefore presents alternatives or suggestions for further consideration in the light of other information and research conducted by the Review.

Options at the Provincial Level

The critical success factors for horizontal coordination at the provincial level are:

Another way of looking at the issue is to consider the key governance tasks that will need to be undertaken at the provincial level. These tasks include the development of a policy framework, the development of strategies and action plans, resourcing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, public engagement and communication, and public accountability. The following table indicates who could take the lead on these various tasks between the executive (Cabinet) or the bureaucracy (ministries).

Governance Task Lead
Development of a policy framework, including objectives, principles and key outcomes. Cabinet
Development of strategies, approaches, or action plans to achieve the objectives and outcomes. Ministries
Providing adequate resources to implement approved policies, strategies, approaches and action plans. Cabinet
Implementing policies, strategies, approaches and action plans. Ministries
Monitoring implementation and holding ministries to account. Cabinet
Public engagement and communication. Ministries
Accounting to the public. Cabinet

At the executive level, therefore, a Cabinet committee or subcommittee of relevant ministers could be set up to develop the policy framework, identify and align resources, monitor implementation, hold ministers to account, and account to the public. The Cabinet committee should have a strong chair — either the Premier or a strong lead minister. It could be supported by a small but highly skilled secretariat in the Cabinet Office or in the lead ministry, as well as an interdepartmental committee of deputy ministers.

At the bureaucratic level, working groups, task forces, project teams, and other partnerships could be established to develop and implement strategies and action plans. These working groups could bring in the required expertise from within and outside of government and could be under the overall direction of the interdepartmental committee of deputy ministers.

The commitment and accountability of relevant ministries and provincial agencies and service providers to the plans could be secured through formal accountability agreements. The information required to enhance decision-making, demonstrate results, and improve accountability should be defined and captured through these agreements. The Cabinet committee and the Premier should be regularly informed of the results achieved, and there should also be an annual report to the public on progress.

Youth and other external stakeholders could be engaged at the provincial level through a provincial advisory council. This council could provide advice to the Cabinet committee through the lead minister, provide independent monitoring of implementation, and appoint representatives to the working groups or task forces. It could also set up regional or community-based substructures to engage and provide feedback across the province.

There are a number of ministries that could potentially be involved in addressing the roots of youth violence, including: the Ministry of Children and Youth Services, the Ministry of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Community and Social Services, the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, and the Cabinet Office. The criteria for selecting which ministry should take the lead could include:

Options at the Community Level

The critical success factors and our discussions would indicate that in order to achieve coordination at the community level there should be:

The transfer of responsibility to the community level could be done through a phased and iterative approach — starting with pilot initiatives and the provision of support to learning and knowledge sharing, and extending to a more general approach to community-based provincial support for the delivery of youth services in priority communities.

Options for Vertical Coordination

Municipalities in the province are key stakeholders and must be part of any strategy that links provincial policies and funding with community-based planning and delivery. Municipal engagement in provincial policy development, planning, the development of measurable outcomes, the identification of targeted communities, and the monitoring of results would be important. The relevant municipalities would also be key partners in coordination at the community level — regardless of whether the community coordinating body was part of, or led by, local government.

As already noted, it will be important to build on models already in place or under development — for example, Toronto’s Neighbourhood Action Partnerships. A formalized agreement or memorandum of understanding with each municipality where community coordination is to be tested and supported may be necessary — with the appropriate funding, measurable outcomes, methods of assessing progress against those outcomes and strategies for supporting community-based coordination identified.

At the provincial level, municipal engagement could be facilitated through the Ministry of Municipal and Urban Affairs, through municipal representation on the provincial advisory council and its substructures, and through membership on working groups and other planning and implementation structures.

Coordination with the federal government could be done through the community level partnerships and/or through the provincial level structures, depending on the issue or initiative that is involved. Over the longer term, the provincial government could negotiate more alignment of federal policies and programs with the provincial policy frameworks, strategies, and action plans.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the selection of the appropriate governance options will be informed by the priorities and recommendations of the Review, by the other work that it has conducted on existing provincial investments and programs and the best approaches for the prevention of youth violence, and by the targeted consultation and community insight sessions. The details of the preferred option could be further developed through additional discussions with provincial ministries, municipalities, and community-based and youth organizations.

References

Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance. (2006, March). Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Addressing Canada’s Fiscal Imbalance. Council of the Federation.

August, Martine and Leo Christopher. (2006). The National Homelessness Initiative and Community Difference.

Bakvis, Herman and Luc Juillet. (2004). The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership. Canada School of Public Service.

Bradford, Neil. (2004, February). Place Matters and Multi-Level Governance: Perspectives on a New Urban Policy Paradigm. Policy Options, 39-44.

Bradford, Neil. (2005, March). Place-based public Policy: Towards a new Urban and Community Agenda for Canada. Canadian Policy Research Network.

Chantal, Collin. (2007, 26 October). Poverty Reduction Strategies in Quebec and in Newfoundland and Labrador. Parliament Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament.

Christopher, Leo and Martine August. (2005). The Federal Government and Homelessness: Community Initiative or Dictation From Above? Manitoba: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

City Of Vancouver. (2004). Downtown Eastside Crime Prevention / Community Development Project. Administrative Report to Vancouver City Council.

Department for Communities and Local Government. (1999). Cross–cutting Issues in Public Policy and Public Service. (Full Report).

Deputy Minister Task Force. (1996, December). Managing Horizontal Policy Issues.

Eliadis, Pearl and Benoît Leduc. (2003). Legislative Approaches to Addressing Poverty and Social Exclusion: Quebec, Belgium and France Innovate. Horizons Policy Research Initiative, 6(2), 41-43.

Gouvernement du Québec. (July 2004). Cadre de référence en matière d’action communautaire.Gouvernement du Québec. (2007). État de situation de l’intervention gouvernementale en matière d’action communautaire, Édition 2006-2007. Secrétariat à l’action communautaire autonome et aux initiatives sociales.Government of Canada. (2006, October 17). Speech From The Throne.

Government of Quebec. (2002). An Act to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion. Bill 112.

Government of Quebec. (2002, August). National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion: The Will to Act, the Strength to Succeed.

Graham, John, Bruce Amos and Tim Plumptre. (2003). Principles for Good Governance in the 21st Century. Institute On Governance.

Hopkins, Mary, Chantal Couture and Elizabeth Moore. (2001). Moving from the Heroic to the Everyday: Lessons Learned from Leading Horizontal Projects. CCMD Roundtable on the Management of Horizontal Initiatives.

Human Resources Development Canada. (2003). Evaluation of the National Homelessness Initiative: Implementation and Early Outcomes of the HRDC-based Components, (Final Report).

Institute for the Prevention of Crime. (2007). Building a Safer Canada (First Report). National Working Group on Crime Prevention.

Institute of Public Administration Australia. (2002, March). Working Together: Integrated Governance.

Macleod Institute. (2004, February). In the spirit of the Vancouver Agreement: A Governance Case Study.

Management Advisory Committee. (2004). Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges, Commonwealth of Australia.

Mason, Michael. (2006). Collaborative partnerships for urban development: a study of the Vancouver Agreement. London: LSE Research Online : http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000692.

Ministère de l’emploi, de la solidarité sociale et de la famille. (2004, April). Reconciling Freedom and Social Justice: A Challenge for the Future – Government Action Plan to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion. Government of Quebec. Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale. (2001). Community action: A crucial contribution to the exercise of citizenship and social development in Québec.

Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale. (2007). Enquête par sondage auprès des organismes communautaires financés par le gouvernement du Québec: Synthèse et discussion des résultats, Évaluation de la mise en oeuvre de la politique gouvernementale: L’action communautaire: une contribution essentielle à l’exercice de la citoyenneté et au développement social du Québec. Direction de l’évaluation.

Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale. (2007). Rapport annuel de gestion 2006-2007.

Ministry of Consumer and Business Services. (2003, May). Partnership Strategy for Horizontal Initiatives: Partnership Strategy and Framework. Ontario.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada. (2005, November). Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons (Chapter 4).

Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. (2006, January). National Evaluation of Local Strategic Partnerships: Formative Evaluation and Action Research Programme 2002-2005, (Final Report).

Pelletier, M. Benoît. (2008, January 18). Speech by the Minister of Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs.

Perri, 6. (2004). Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(1), 103-138.

Peters, B. Guy. (1998). Managing Horizontal Government: the Politics of Coordination. Canadian Centre for Management Development, January 1998.

Rounce, Andrea D. and Norman Beaudry. (2003). Using Horizontal Tools to Work Across Boundaries: Lessons Learned and Signposts for Success. CCMD Roundtable on Horizontal Mechanisms.

Roy, Marie-Renée. (2007). Fighting Poverty and Exclusion in Quebec.

Saint-Martin, Denis. (2004). Coordinating Interdependence: Governance and Social Policy Redesign in Britain, the European Union and Canada. Canadian Policy Research Network.

Smith, Ralph. (2004). Policy Development and Implementation in Complex Files: Lessons from the National Homelessness Initiative. Canada School of Public Service.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. (1995). The Federal Government as ‘Partner’: Six Steps to Successful Collaboration.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. (2006). National Homelessness Initiative, Ontario.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. (2006). National Homelessness Initiative, British Columbia.

The Vancouver Agreement, 9 March 2000.

Appendix 1

Summary of Illustrative Examples

Name of Initiative & Brief Description Type of Coordination Focus Mechanisms Structure
Social Exclusion Task Force, Cabinet Office, UK
- Set up in 2006
- To coordinate the government’s drive against social exclusion, focusing on those that are hardest to reach
- To ensure a cross—departmental approach
Horizontal (central government) Policy - Consultations
- Guiding Principles
- Action Plan and annual progress reports
- 10-year strategic review
- Public Service Agreements
- Cross-departmental pilot schemes
- Ongoing policy work -- reviews, policies, centres of excellence, code of practice for evaluation
- Research
- Located in Cabinet Office
- headed by Minister for Cabinet Office
- Reports to Cabinet Subcommittee on Social Exclusion
- Formerly part of Office of Deputy Prime Minister and closely connected to the Prime Minister
Vertical (central, regional, local) Policy - Local Area Agreements
- cross-governmental pilot schemes
- Government offices in the regions
- Local authorities
- Local Strategic Partnerships
Race, Cohesion and Faiths Directorate, UK
- Formed in May 2006
- Works with other departments to reduce race and faith inequalities in education, health, housing, and the criminal justice system, as well as the labour market
Horizontal (central government) Policy Projects - cross-departmental strategy, indicators & annual progress reports
- Public Service Agreements
- Strategic grants for national organizations
- Other initiatives to engage stakeholders or address particular issues
- a directorate in the Department for Communities and Local Government
- formerly part of Home Office
Vertical (central, regional, local) Policy Projects - Local Area Agreements
- Project grants for regional organizations and community grants for local groups
- Government offices in the regions
- Local authorities
- Local Strategic Partnerships
National Homelessness Initiative, Canada
- 1999-2007
- To address the homelessness crisis by developing community-based measures and strengthening community capacity
Horizontal (federal government) Programs - Consultations
- National Homelessness Initiative
- New programs
- Enhancement of existing programs
- Research and action learning
- Enhancement to existing information system on homeless individuals & families
- Surplus federal real property
- Federal Coordinator on Homelessness in initial stages
- National Secretariat on Homelessness, HRDC
- Interdepartmental meetings
- Federal regional councils
- Community facilitators
Vertical (federal, provincial, municipal) Projects - Community homelessness plans - Provincial and municipal facilitators in some cases
- Community tables with federal, provincial and municipal representation
Community-based Projects - Community homelessness plans
- Federal funding for planning & eligible projects
- Leveraging of other funding
- Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative
- Community advisory board reviews and recommends projects for funding and participates in community planning
- Municipality or other community entity receives funds, negotiates project agreements, and disburses funds, OR HRDC negotiates project agreements and disburses funds
Delegation Example: Calgary Homeless Foundation Projects - Three Year Plan to Address Homelessness
- Grants to non-profit organizations to address housing needs
- Research and evaluation
- Public advocacy
- Community entity model — Foundation
- Board of Directors with three levels of government, United Way, and business and community leaders and service providers
- Community Action Committee — inclusive community advisory forum
- Funders’ table — coordinates funding decisions
- National Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion, Quebec
- Legislated in 2002
- To combat poverty, prevent its causes, reduce its effects on individuals and families, counter social exclusion, and strive towards a poverty-free Quebec
- Originated with a broad-based citizens’ movement
Horizontal (provincial government) Policy Programs - Citizen mobilization and petition
- Act to guide government and Quebec society as a whole
- National Strategy
- Action Plan, annual progress reports, status report every three years
-Assessment of proposed legislation regulation for impact
- Minister of Employment and Social Solidarity has lead responsibility
- Reports to Cabinet committee on social, education and cultural development
- Interdepartmental committee responsible for monitoring and evaluating the action plan and communications
- Advisory committee from outside government
- Research centre with managing committee
Vertical (federal, provincial, regional, municipal) Projects - Negotiation with federal government for financial support
- Grant funds, largely financed by lottery, for regional and municipal pilots
- Regional and local planning and agreements, including decentralization
- Devolution of grant management to City Montreal
- Aboriginal agreements
- Regional conferences of elected officials and others for regional and local planning and prioritizing
Community-based Projects - Community support grants to act as a catalyst for private, public and community partners
Cabinet Committee on Race Relations, Ontario
- 1979 to 1990
- To develop policies to respond to concerns about racism
- Up to 1987, chaired by the Attorney General; after 1987, chaired by the Minister of Citizenship.
Horizontal (provincial government) Policy - Initial policy statement
- Individual areas of policy development
- Individual ministries implemented policies that were approved
- Cabinet committee with eight ministries
- Deputies’ committee of DMs
- Supported by a secretary in Cabinet Office, policy branch in the Ministry of the Attorney General and a working group of policy persons
- Inter-ministerial Task Forces
- Smart Growth, Ontario54 - Announced in 2001 - Based on three principles: strong economy, strong communities and clean, healthy environment - To manage growth and development ensure planning and budgeting of infrastructure maximizes the use of existing infrastructure and well coordinated locally and regionally Horizontal (provincial) Policy - Vision
- Principles
- Consultations
- Goals
- Regional Smart Growth Plans
- Amendment of Planning Act
- Infrastructure investment plan
- Greenbelt Plan
- Places to Grow Act
- Smart Growth Secretariat (SGS), Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing to 2003, then Ontario Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal
- Inter-ministerial Corporate Steering Committee
- Five Inter-Ministerial Zone Committees
- Five Smart Growth Panels
- Executive committee of panel chairs and SGS
- Ontario Smart Growth Network
Vancouver Agreement
- Signed in 1999
- Partnership of federal, provincial and municipal governments to work in collaboration with communities on economic, social and community development
Vertical (federal,provincial,municipal) Projects - Agreement
- Joint planning and priority setting
- Information-sharing,
- Research and evaluation
- Specific funds and leveraging of existing funds
- Policy Committee — political decision-making and accountability
- Management Committee — senior officials of lead departments — relationships, communication, monitoring and evaluation, investment decisions, oversight
- Intergovernmental Coordination Team
National Crime Prevention Strategy,Canada
- Launched in 1998
- A policy framework for the implementation of crime prevention interventions in Canada, based on a social development approach
Vertical (national, provincial, local) Programs - National Crime Prevention Strategy
- Principles
- Funding programs for community-based projects
- Research and knowledge development fund
- Partnership arrangements with P/Ts
- Protocols with other federal departments
- National Crime Prevention Centre in PSEPC
- Regional offices
- F/P/T Working Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention
- Joint Management Committees to set funding priorities and recommend projects; includes reps from police services and community agencies
Local Health Integration Networks, Ontario
- Created in March 2006, operational from April 1, 2007
- To plan, coordinate and fund health care service provision by major health care providers in 14 regions
Vertical (provincial, regional) Services - MOHLTC Strategic Plan (forthcoming)
- Three-year integrated health service plan and annual integrated reporting
- Accountability Agreement between MOHLTC and LHIN with performance indicators and targets and standards
- Service Accountability Agreements between LHIN and each health service provider
- MOHLTC health system divisions
- Local Health Integration Networks — non-profit corporation — nine-member appointed board of directors
- Health Professionals Advisory Committee
- Health service provider boards
- Champlain LHIN:
- Communities of care
- Communities of practice
- Councils of expertise
- Local Strategic Partnerships, UK
- Created in 2000
- Single nonstatutory multi-agency bodies aligned with local authority boundaries
- Set vision, integrate planning, engage communities, monitor progress
Community-based (central, local) Services - Sustainable Community Strategy
- Local Area Agreement — three-year agreement between council and central government based on Strategy
- Performance indicators
- Consolidation of funding to local government and to community and voluntary organizations
- Performance Reward Grant
- Community networks
- LSPs — health services, police service, fire services, local and regional government, business, voluntary & community organizations
- Local authority administration
Youth Inclusion Programme, UK
- Established in 2000
- To prevent offending and reoffending by children and young people by engaging them in constructive activities
- Operates in 110 of the most deprived/high crime estates in England and Wales
Community-based (local authority, neighbourhood) Services - Local youth justice plan
- Identification of those at risk, assessment, increased access to mainstream and specialist services
- Identification of priority neighbourhoods, audit of what projects exist, prioritize problems, draw up action plan, implement, monitor and report
- Annual grants that must be matched
- MIS for management, monitoring and evaluation
- Youth Justice Board for England and Wales — monitors, advises, identifies and promotes good practice, makes grants to local authorities
- National Supporter and Regional Supporters to provide support in project management
- Regional evaluators
- Youth Offending Teams — probation officer, social worker, police officer, health worker, education worker — coordinate provision of youth justice services
- YIP Managers
Children’s Services Committees, Ontario
- To unify separate programs directly related to children’s services into an integrated system
- To enable local governments to take responsibility for ensuring the provision of services to children in their area
Community-based (municipal government) Services - Consultations
- Pilot projects
- Relationship-building within committee and with other sectors
- Structures — three models in terms of representation: municipal, provider, mixed
- Assessment of needs and resources
- Strategy
- Program and budget review capability
- Local community service plans
- Protocols with Area Offices
- External monitoring and evaluation from the outset
- Children’s Services Division in Ministry Community and Social Services
- Area offices
- Children’s Services Committees of municipal, provider citizen members for service coordination the municipal level
- Launched in 1977, piloted from 1978 to 1982, cancelled before devolution of responsibility and funding to municipal government
Neighbourhood Action, Toronto
- Adopted in 2005
- To strengthen priority neighbourhoods through targeted investment in infrastructure, programs and services
Community-based (municipal, neighbourhood) Programs Services - Community Safety Plan (2004)
- Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force (2004)
- Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (2005)
- Identification of neighbourhoods
- Identification of City services and resources, development of integrated service delivery priorities and outcomes
- Pilot initiatives
- Interdivisional Committee on Integrated Responses for Priority Neighbourhoods
- Social Development Finance and Administration
- Neighbourhood Action Teams (13 neighbourhoods) — City divisions and boards
- Neighbourhood Action Partnerships — expanded to include broader community stakeholders and councillors
- Community Development Officers
Neighbourhood Integrated Service Teams, Vancouver
- Adopted in 1994
- To shift decision-making and responsibility for solving issues to front-line workers
Community-based (municipal, neighbourhood) Services - Respond to complaints that require collaboration across departmental and agency boundaries
- Residents identify issues, responsibilities clarified, action plan developed
- NISTs — police, fire, engineering, planning, permits and licences, community centres, libraries, school board, health authority -in all 16 neighbourhoods
- Lead facilitator
- NIST Steering Committee of lead facilitators
- NIST coordinator
Community Safety & Crime Prevention Council, Waterloo Region
- Set up in 1994
- To bring police service, community agencies, social, neighbourhood, and health programs together in partnership, close gaps in service, and identify new directions for preventing crime
Community-based (community organizations) Projects Services - Demonstration projects
- Advice to local government
- Partnership building
- Public education
- Community Safety & Crime Prevention Council — 25 members
- Community engagement coordinators
Community Action, Quebec
- Adopted in 2001, implemented from 2004
- Recognizes the contribution of community actions organizations to Quebec’s economic and social development
- Provided funding for core operations in addition to contracts for services and project-based funding
Community-based (community organizations) Programs Services - Community Action Policy
- Action Plan
- Guidelines for government departments and agencies
- Consolidated funding into three streams — core, service agreements, and projects
- Consolidated relationship with similar organizations into one ministry
- Harmonization and streamlining of funding
- Fund to assist community action
- Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity is lead ministry
- Secretariat for community action
- Interdepartmental committee
- Advisory committee of community sectors and multi-sectoral groupings

Appendix 2:

Focus Group Attendees

February 20 Government Representatives

Joan Andrew. Deputy Minister, Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration

Kevin Costante, Deputy Minister, Associate Secretary of the Cabinet, Policy

Michelle DiEmanuele, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Government & Consumer Services

Nancy Matthews, Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration Division, City of Toronto

Cliodhna McMullin, Assistant Deputy Minister, Ministry of Community and Social Services

Cindy Morton, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Health Promotion

Ron Sapsford, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Health

Philip Steenkamp, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities

Judith Wright, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Children and Youth Services

March 6, 2008, Community Representatives

Carrie Butcher, Program Manager, Toronto, Ontario Trillium Foundation

Denise Campbell, Manager, City of Toronto

Dr. Gervan Fearon, Tropicana Community Services

Lew Golding, Manager, SAPACCY, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health

Violetta Iikiw, Program Manager, Laidlaw Foundation

Laura Palmer Korn, Senior Vice President, Employment and Community, YMCA Toronto

Gillian Mason, VP Strategic Initiatives and Community Partnership, United Way of Greater Toronto

Stoney McCart, Executive Director, Students Commission

Lidia Monaco, Director, Children and Youth, St. Christopher House

Les Nemes, Deputy Director of Education, Academic Affairs, Toronto Catholic District School Board

Donna Quan, System Superintendant, Toronto District School Board

Christine Sadeler, Executive Director, Community Safety and Crime Prevention Council, Waterloo

Sue Wilkinson, Executive Director, Jane Finch Community and Family Centre


1 Further details on the origins of the principles can be found in Graham et al. (2003).

2 Adapted from a number of sources, including Institute of Public Administration Australia (2002) and Rounce and Beaudry (2003).

3 Perri, 6 (2004), p. 109.

4 Peters (1998),, p. 1.

5 Management Advisory Committee (2004), p. 4–6.

6 Ministry of Consumer and Business Services (2003), p. 6–7.

7 Institute of Public Administration of Australia (2002),, p. 77.

8 “The term ‘wicked issues’ is reserved for those policy problems that cannot be addressed within the structures, processes and cultures conventionally managed by public policy. Wicked issues challenge conventional approaches in a number of ways: they are issues that do not appear to belong to any single organization, they represent problems that are difficult to define and even more difficult to link to causes, and they are intractable in that there do not appear to be readily available solutions at hand.” Saint-Martin (2004), p. 1.

9 Management Advisory Committee (2004), p. 10.

10 Ibid.

11 Bradford (2004).

12 Ibid, p. 40.

13 Bradford (2005), p. vi.

14 Institute of Public Administration of Australia (2002), p. 95. 15 Ibid, p. 96

15 Ibid, p. 96

16 Although we will use the National Homelessness Initiative to illustrate a number of challenges related to horizontal, vertical and community-based coordination, this is not intended to imply that the Initiative was particularly bad. In fact, our experience with other initiatives of the federal government would indicate that the problems NHI faced are typical of most federal government initiatives. Rather, the NHI has been chosen because it has been particularly well documented.

17 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2006), Ontario and British Columbia.

18 Office of the Auditor General of Canada (2005), Chapter 4.

19 Smith (2004), p. 12-13.

20 Human Resources Development Canada (2003).

21 Roy (2007).

22 Eliadis and Leduc (2003)..

23 Chantal (2007).

24 Department for Communities and Local Government (1999), p. 43.

25 John Prescott, who was elected Deputy Leader of the Labour Party in opposition, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Tony Blair in 1997, in addition to being Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. In 2001, this "superdepartment" was split up, with Prescott being given his own Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, with fewer specific responsibilities, but retaining responsibility for social exclusion. In May 2006, in a Cabinet reshuffle, the department was removed from the control of the Deputy Prime Minister and renamed as the Department for Communities and Local Government, with Ruth Kelly as the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Up to 2006, therefore, the location of the Social Exclusion Unit followed the Deputy Prime Minister.

26 The terms of reference of the Life Chances Committee are to consider policies which maximize the life chances of all in the UK. The Subcommittee on Social Exclusion includes the Secretaries of State responsible for justice, home affairs, health, employment, communities and local government, education, training, sports and recreation, and business development.

27 Smith (2004), p. 9-11.

28 This point was already raised in the discussion on NHI. A more detailed review of the governance of federal-provincial fiscal relations is provided in Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance (2006), p. 17-19.

29 Pelletier (2008), p. 8.

30 Government of Canada (2006), p. 8.

31 The other agreements are with Edmonton, Saskatoon, Regina and Winnipeg. An agreement with Victoria is currently under negotiation, as well as one with Surrey, BC.

32 The Vancouver Agreement (2000), p. 1, emphasis added.

33 Office of the Auditor General of Canada (2005), p. 15–18.

34 Bakvis and Juillet (2004), p. 42.

35 Ibid, p. 43.

36 Ibid, p. 44.

37 Macleod Institute (2004).

38 Mason (2006), p. 16–28.

39 Smith (2004), p. 19.

40 Human Resources Development Canada (2003), p. ii.

41 Ibid, p. 17–18.

42 Christopher and August (2005), p. 10–15.

43 August and Christopher (2006), p. 17–18.

44 Smith (2004), p. 17–18.

45 Some areas in England have only one local authority responsible for all council services — called a unitary authority. Other areas have a district council for some services and a county council for others, like education and social services, and these are called two-tier authorities. In these cases, most of the resources lie with the county council. Rural areas and some urban areas also have parish councils.

46 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2006), p. 7-9.

47 Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale (2001)

48 Organizations that are excluded from the policy include professional associations, unions, religious or political organizations, and foundations whose sole purpose is to raise and allocate funds.

49 Gouvernement du Québec (2004).

49 Gouvernement du Québec (2007).

51 Community development corporations were first set up in 1984 and currently exist in 40 communities in the province. They bring together community organizations working on a range of social and economic issues, for the purposes of dialogue, information sharing, joint training, development of community resources, and advocacy.

52 Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale (2007) Rapport.

53 Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale (2007) Enquête.

54 We could not determine the status of the Smart Growth Strategy, the five regional smart growth plans, or the current structure for coordinating at the provincial and regional level.

Contents

Volume 1. Findings, Analysis and Conclusions

Volume 2. Executive Summary

Volume 3. Community Perspectives Report

Volume 4. Research Papers

Volume 5. Literature Reviews